Due Process Notice Required for Real Estate Tax Sales by Dempsey, Vicki A.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 49 
Issue 2 Spring 1984 Article 8 
Spring 1984 
Due Process Notice Required for Real Estate Tax Sales 
Vicki A. Dempsey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Vicki A. Dempsey, Due Process Notice Required for Real Estate Tax Sales, 49 MO. L. REV. (1984) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss2/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
DUE PROCESS NOTICE REQUIRED
FOR REAL ESTATE TAX SALES
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams'
Every year, local authorities are faced with collecting deliquent real es-
tate taxes. A variety of methods have been adopted to accomplishing the task.
Some states provide for judicial foreclosure.' A few states allow a choice be-
tween judicial and non-judicial proceedings.2 The majority have some form of
non-judicial power of sale proceeding.'
The type of notice given in conjunction with these tax sales varies widely
from state to state. Depending on the statutory provisions, a tax collector may
only have to publish notice of sale in a local newspaper." Some tax collectors
may only be required to mail a notice of delinquency to the taxpayer, stating
that the property is subject to sale, without giving information as to the time,
place, or date of the sale.6 A tax collector may have the duty to send certified
or registered mail notice of time, date, and place of sale to the taxpayer.
7
Failure to send this notice may have no effect on the validity of the sale.
8
Finally, some statutes require the tax collector to send notice not only to the
owner/taxpayer, but to mortgagees and lienholders as well,9 though some stat-
1. 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
2. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 40-10-1 to -8 1975); MINN. STAT. §§ 279.01-.37
(1968 & Supp. 1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5721.18 (Page Supp. 1982); OR. REv.
STAT. §§ 312.005-.990 (1983). This process entails sending a summons to the taxpayer,
and holding a hearing before a judge, which often results in a default judgment and a
court-ordered sale of the property.
3. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 8701-8779 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 60, § 35 (West 1973); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 361.565-.730 (1983); N.Y. REAL.
PROP. TAX LAW § 1110-1116 (McKinney 1972).
4. The variations are many. In a few states, the tax sale purchaser is given a
tax deed, and if no redemption takes place within a given time period, usually one to
three years, the deed automatically becomes enforceable. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 246-60 (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:2183 (West 1982). In other states, the
purchaser receives only a tax certificate and must take affirmative action to seek a tax
deed after a period of redemption has elapsed. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 197.241
(West Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 100-106 (1980 & Supp. 1983).
5. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 140.170.1 (1978):
The county collector shall cause a copy of the list of delinquent lands and lots
to be printed in some newspaper of general circulation published in the
county, for three consecutive weeks, one insertion weekly, before the sale, the
last insertion to be at least fifteen days prior to the fourth Monday in August.
6. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-11-101 (1982).
7. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. § 42-1835 (1980).
8. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 134.440(1) (1982).
9. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5252(4) (1981).
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utes require the mortgagee or interested party to have requested this notice in
advance.'0
This hodgepodge of laws has been in constitutional doubt for some years
at the state level."" In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,1 the United
States Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of what notice is constitu-
tionally required in connection with tax sales. In Mennonite, the Court held
that notice of a tax sale by publication and posting was inadequate for mort-
gagees."1 As a result, the current Missouri statutes 4 and those of many states
may no longer meet due process requirements under the fourteenth amend-
10. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1.1-24-4.2(a) (Burns Supp. 1984).
11. See generally Legg, Tax Sales and the Constitution, 20 OKLA. L. REv. 365
(1967); Note, Due Process: The Constitutional Requirement of Notice in Tax Sale
Proceedings, 30 ARK. L. REV. 73 (1976); Comment, Constitutional Law-In Rem Tax
Foreclosures-Due Process Requires Notice by Mail When Name and Address of
Taxpayer are Easily Ascertainable, 9 RUT.-CAM. L. REv. 565 (1978); Note, Due Pro-
cess in Tax Sales in New York: The Insufficiency of Notice by Publication, 25 SYRA-
cUsE L. REV. 769 (1974); Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Notice by Publi-
cation in Tax Sale Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 159 (1976); Note, Constitutional
Law-Due Process-Notice by Publication is Constitutionally Inadequate in a Tax
Sale Proceeding, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1463 (1978); Note, The Constitutionality of No-
tice by Publication in Tax Sale Proceedings, 84 YALE L.J. 1505 (1975).
12. 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
13. Id. at 2709.
14. Collection of delinquent real estate taxes in Missouri currently falls under
one of three sets of statutes. The oldest and most widely applicable law is known as the
Jones-Munger Act, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 140.010-.720 (1978). This law provides for a
non-judicial power of sale and it requires only notice by publication. See note 5 supra.
Chartered class one counties (defined in Mo. REV. STAT. § 48.020 (Supp. 1983))
as having assessed valuation of three hundred million dollars) may elect to use the
Land Tax Collection Law, Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 141.210-.810 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
Currently this law is used only in Jackson County. St. Louis County used to apply
Chapter 141, but elected to switch back to the Jones-Munger Act some years ago after
deciding judicial foreclosure was too expensive and time consuming. Telephone inter-
view with Thomas W. Wehrle, Attorney for the County of St. Louis (Nov. 18, 1983).
The City of St. Louis is governed by the Municipal Land Reutilization Law, Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 92.700-.920 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
Sections 92.760.1 and 141.440 are unlike the Jones-Munger Act in that they re-
quire a judicial sale and mailed notice to persons named in the petition as being the
last-known taxpayers. Originally, both statutes contained the caveat that the failure to
mail the notice did not invalidate the proceeding. Mo. REV. STAT. § 92.760.1 (1978)
(repealed 1982); id. § 141.440 (repealed 1982). In 1982, an amendment to § 131.440
mandated mailed notice to the last-known owner of record. 1982 Mo. Laws 319. In
fact, if the notice is returned to the collector as undeliverable, other than for the reason
the addressee simply refused to accept the certified mail, the collector must search the
records to try to ascertain the successor owner. Moreover, § 141.540 was amended to
give the collector the option to send certified mail to the mortgagee or security holder.
1982 Mo. Laws 321. These amendments likely are the result of Garzee v. Sauro, 639
S.W.2d 830 (Mo. 1982). See notes 57-59 and accompanying text infra. For discussion
on the history of delinquent tax legislation, see M. GILL, REAL PROPERTY LAW IN
MISSOURI 1165-68 (1949).
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ment.15 Mennonite raises at least four questions: (1) whether notice to owners,
where not already required by statute, is now necessary; (2) what notice to
other interested parties is required; (3) the rights and remedies of purchasers
at tax sales; and (4) whether the decision will be applied retroactively.
Mennonite Board of Missions (MBM) took back a mortgage"6 on prop-
erty in Indiana to secure a $14,000 loan. The mortgagor was responsible for
paying all of the property taxes, but without MBM's knowledge, failed to do
so. In 1977, the county initiated proceedings to sell the mortgagor's property
for non-payment of taxes as provided for by Indiana law.18 This included post-
ing notice in the county courthouse, publishing notice once each week for three
consecutive weeks,19 and sending notice by certified mail to the last-known
address of the property owner.20 Until 1980, Indiana law did not provide for
notice by mail or personal service to mortgagees.21
On August 8, 1977, the property was sold to Richard Adams for
$1,165.75. Following the sale, the mortgagor continued to make monthly pay-
ments to MBM. It was not until August 16, 1979 that MBM learned that the
property had been sold. By then, the redemption period of two years had run,
and the mortgagor still owed MBM $8,237.19.22 In November, 1979, Adams
filed suit in an Indiana state court to quiet title to the property. The trial court
sustained Adams' motion for summary judgment despite MBM's contention
that it had not received constitutionally adequate notice of the tax sale or the
opportunity to redeem. 23 The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed. 2
The United States Supreme Court's six to three decision was controlled
by Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,25 which held that prior to
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law. .. ."
16. While Mennonite dealt with a real estate mortgage, it will be assumed for
purposes of this Note that deeds of trust on real property would be treated in a like
manner. See Lohr v. Cobur Corp., 654 S.W.2d 883, 887 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (Black-
mar, J., concurring). See generally G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 1.6 (1979).
17. 103 S. Ct. at 2708.
18. Id. at 2709. The county proceeded under IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1.1-24.1 to
-12 (Burns 1978) (amended 1980).
19. 103 S. Ct. at 2709; see IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-3 (Burns 1978)
(amended 1980).
20. 103 S. Ct. at 2709; see IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-4 (Bums 1978). A
mortgagee has no title to the mortgaged property under Indiana law, so he is not con-
sidered an "owner" for purposes of this section. See First Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fur-
nish, 174 Ind. App. 265, 271, 367 N.E.2d 596, 600 (1977).
21. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-4.2 (Burns 1978) (amended 1980).
22. 103 S. Ct. at 2709.
23. Id. Redemption rights exist for two years after the sale. See IND. CODE
ANN.§ 6-1.1-25-4 (1978).
24. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 427 N.E.2d 686 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
25. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
1984]
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an action that will affect a property interest protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, a state must provide "notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions."2 The Mennonite Court concluded that a mortgagee has a legally pro-
tected property interest that is significantly affected by a tax sale.27 Notice by
publication, posted notice, and mailed notice to the property owner were not
adequate to meet the Mullane test. Personal service or mailed notice to mort-
gagees is now required, even though the Court noted that "sophisticated credi-
tors," i.e., commercial lenders, have the means to discover if property taxes
are delinquent and if a tax sale would ensue.28
Historically, courts have distinguished between in rem and in personam
proceedings.29 Constructive notice by publication was deemed sufficient for in
rem proceedings, including tax sales. At the turn of the century, the "care-
taker theory" arose; the Supreme Court presupposed that owners of property
would keep themselves informed of any proceeding affecting it.30
Although Mullane and its progeny3 clearly rejected this theory, state
courts in Missouri,32 California, 3 and Oklahoma 34 have maintained that no-
26. Id. at 314.
27. 103 S. Ct. at 2711. The Court reached this conclusion after noting that a
mortgagee's lien may be conveyed and has priority over subsequent claims or liens
attaching to the property. Id.
28. Id. at 2712.
29. Service by publication "may answer in all actions which are substantially
proceedings in rem. But. . .where the suit is merely in personam, constructive service
in this form upon a non-resident is ineffectual for any purpose." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 727 (1877).
30. See North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925); Long-
year v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414, 418 (1908).
31. See, e.g., Schroeder v. City of N.Y., 371 U.S. 208, 211 (1962) (notice by
publication in condemnation proceedings constitutionally inadequate); Walker v. City
of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956) (newspaper publication in land condemnation
inadequate where plaintiff resident's name was known to the city); Covey v. Town of
Somners, 351 U.S. 141, 146-67 (1956) (notice by publication and mail to known
mental incompetent of real property tax sale proceedings violated due process clause).
32. McMullin v. Carter, 639 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). This case in-
volved an action to quiet title to property purchased at a tax sale conducted under the
Jones-Munger Act. See note 14 supra. The trial court found the statute unconstitu-
tional because it did not require the tax collector to give notice by mail to persons
owning and residing on property sought to be sold by a tax sale. 639 S.W.2d at 816.
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed and upheld the statute as constitutional. Id. at
817 (citing two pre-Mullane cases, Spitcaufsky v. Hatten, 353 Mo. 94, 182 S.W.2d 86
(1944); Kennen v. McFarling, 350 Mo. 180, 165 S.W.2d 681 (1942)).
McMullin was decided incorrectly. The court ignored the impact of Mullane on
notice requirements. Furthermore, Spitcaufsky was placed in doubt four years before
McMullin by Collector of Revenue v. Parcels of Land Encumbered, 566 S.W.2d 475,
477-78 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (although court ultimately refused to address questions
of notice because the defendant did not have standing, dicta cited other states which
applied Mullane to tax sales and found a lack of due process). Finally, on the same day
[Vol. 49
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tice by publication is adequate. Fourteen states continue to conduct tax sales
following only newspaper publication, 5 with Oregon and North Carolina go-
ing so far as to say that publication creates a conclusive presumption of actual
notice.36 An additional seven states do require notice of delinquency to the
property owner, but this does not include information as to the time, date, and
place of the sale.3
7
In thirteen of the twenty-two states which seemingly ignore Mullane,
there is an interesting caveat. Before the purchaser at the tax sale can actually
obtain a deed to the land, notice that the period of redemption is about to
expire must be given to the titleholder, mortagee, and lienholders of record.38
the court decided McMullin, it handed down Garzee v. Sauro, 639 S.W.2d 830 (Mo.
1982). Citing Mullane, the Garzee court held that publication of notice of foreclosure
would not satisfy notice requirements for due process. While Garzee dealt with the
Land Tax Collection law, see note 14 supra, rather than the Jones-Munger Act, it
seems inequitable that out-state property owners are due less process than those in
Kansas City or St. Louis.
Many county tax collectors in Missouri make the effort to personally contact prop-
erty owners by phone or letter. Telephone survey of tax collectors from the six most
populous counties in Missouri (Sept. 30, 1983). Nevertheless, as pointed out in Mc-
Mullin, this is a matter of grace. 639 S.W.2d at 816. Because the system is not uni-
form, not everyone is receiving the same quality or quantity of notice. It seems inevita-
ble that McMullin will be overruled.
33. Atkins v. Kessler, 97 Cal. App. 3d 784, 793, 159 Cal. Rptr. 231, 236 (1979)
("[Plublication of notice in the ordinary real property tax collection case is all the due
process notice to which a delinquent taxpayer is entitled. Additional notices of sale are
not necessary before the sale.").
34. Christie-Stewart, Inc. v. Paschall, 502 P.2d 1265, 1267-68 (Okla. 1972),
vacated, 414 U.S. 100 (1973), reh'g denied, 544 P.2d 505 (Okla. 1974), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 935 (1976).
35. See IOWA CODE § 446.9 (Supp. 1983-1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2303
(Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 60, § 40 (West 1973); MISS. CODE ANN. §
27-41-55 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 140.170 (1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-17-101
(1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-1804 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-348 (1979); OR.
REV. STAT. § 312.040 (1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-23-2 (1982); TEx. TAX
CODE ANN. § 34.05 (Vernon 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84-64-010 (1962);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 74.33 (West Supp. 1983-84); Wyo. STAT. § 39-3-104 (Supp.
1983).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-348 (1979); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 312.040(1) (1983);
see also MINN. STAT. § 280.01 (Supp. 1984) (titleholder is entitled to only post-sale
notice).
37. ALA. CODE § 40-10-4 (1975); COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-11-101 (1982); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8771 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 197.072 (West Supp. 1983); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:2180 (WEsT 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 75 (Supp. 1983);
VA. CODE § 58-1117.1 (Supp. 1983).
38. See ALA. CODE §§ 40-10-120, -133 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-11-128
(1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 197.256 (West Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 447.9
(West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 106 (1980); MINN. STAT. § 281.13
(Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 27-43-1, -5 (Supp. 1983); NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-
1832 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-374(c) (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE § 84-64-
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Depending on the statute, this notice will be sent from six months to twenty
years after the sale. Why these states choose to send mailed notice after, in-
stead of before, the sale is not clear, for prior notice to interested parties could
eliminate the need for the sale.
Whether post-sale notice will meet the due process test has not been ad-
dressed by courts. Mennonite did not directly resolve this question because
Indiana statutes do not provide for such notice to mortagees.39 Post-sale notice
is adequate to the extent that the party has an opportunity to redeem the
property. Nevertheless, a post-sale redemption price will include interest,
which could be a substantial amount after accruing for six or seven years. The
Mennonite court did refer to notice as a constitutional precondition to state
action adversely affecting a property interest. 0 Basing a prediction on that
language alone, post-sale notice will not meet the test.
Even if post-sale notice is constitutional, there are a few states, Missouri
included, which rely solely on notice by publication. How authorities have
managed to skirt due process requirements for so long may be grounded in a
state's ever-present fiscal needs."1 Collecting tax revenues is a vestige of states'
rights that has long been given special deference. 42 No Supreme Court case
has dealt directly with the issue of notice to property owners or mortgagors at
a tax sale. Dicta in Mennonite, however, suggests that they deserve equal
treatment.43 Common sense dictates that if a creditor should get Mullane-type
notice, so should an owner, especially one in possession who risks losing not
just an investment, but a home.
While some recent cases still follow the caretaker theory,44 from a practi-
cal point of view, what is out of sight is out of mind for many people.4 5 If, as
39. But cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-6 (Burns 1984) (post-sale notice to
owners only).
40. 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
41. See Spitcaufsky v. Hatten, 353 Mo. 94, 108, 182 S.W.2d 86, 94 (1944). See
generally R. LAKE, REAL ESTATE TAX DELINQUENCY: PRIVATE DISINVESTMENT AND
PUBLIC RESPONSE (1979).
42. In authorizing tax sale proceedings, the state is exercising its sovereign
power to raise revenue essential to carry on the affairs of state, and this process does
not require the same kind of notice as a suit at law, or even in proceedings for taking
private property by emminent domain. Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, 89 (1904)
43. Notice by mail or other means equally certain to provide actual notice is the
minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the
property interest of any party, whether knowledgeable or not in commercial practice, if
its name and address are reasonably ascertainable. Mennonite, 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
44. See McMullin v. Carter, 639 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Mo. 1982) (en banc);
Christie-Stewart, Inc. v. Paschall, 502 P.2d 1265, 1267-68 (Okla. 1972), vacated, 414
U.S. 100 (1973), reh'g denied, 544 P.2d 505 (Okla. 1974), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935
(1976).
45. A simple notice that taxes are due or delinquent may not be enough to spur
the conscience of a procrastinating or financially distressed homeowner. Once these
notices stop, because (unbeknownst to the owner) the property has been sold for back
taxes, it could be easy to believe the local tax collector happened to let one case fall
[Vol. 49
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in Missouri, there is no notice of the two-year period of redemption,4 then
quite unexpectedly the homeowner may receive a letter from the tax sale pur-
chaser to either vacate the premises or start paying rent. States may claim this
scenario could be avoided had the homeowner simply been on the alert for the
notice by publication of the tax sale. As the Mullane court stated, however,
"Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertise-
ment in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper.
Missouri courts have seemingly compensated for this lack of due process
by finding exceptions to the Jones-Munger Act.48 A popular attack against tax
sale purchasers was inadequacy of consideration.49 In 1977, the Missouri Su-
preme Court decided that consideration could no longer serve as the sole basis
for setting aside a sale under the Jones-Munger Act. 0 Nevertheless, the court
continued to construe the publication statute very broadly in favor of the own-
er. Sales were found void for inadequacy of the legal description in the no-
tice,51 premature publication, 2 failure to include name of record owner,53 and
failure to recite the correct years of delinquency.84
While Missouri has been skirting the issue, the majority of states have
eliminated the due process problem, at least for property owners, by enacting
statutes which require mailed notice.55 Methods vary from certified or regis-
tered mail to simply postage prepaid. The recipient of the notice varies from
owner or occupant to taxpayer. In three states, a problem arises because tax
between the cracks.
46. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 140.340 (1978).
47. 339 U.S. at 315.
48. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 140.010-.720 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
49. See Bussen Realty Co. v. Benson, 349 Mo. 58, 61, 159 S.W.2d 813, 814
(1942) (en banc).
50. Powell v. County of St. Louis, 559 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Mo. 1977) (en bane).
See generally Note, Tax Sales of Real Estate-Inadequate Consideration No Longer
Grounds for Invalidation, 44 Mo. L. REV. 822 (1979).
51. See Costello v. City of St. Louis, 262 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Mo. 1953); Acton
Enters. v. Stottle, 646 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
52. Wates v. Carnes, 521 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Mo. 1975).
53. Mitchell v. Atherton, 563 S.W.2d 13, 17 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); Nole v.
Wenneker, 609 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). But see Ruley v. Drey, 643
S.W.2d 101, 103-04 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
54. Beldner v. General Elec., 451 S.W.2d 65, 78 (Mo. 1970) (dicta).
55. ALASKA STAT. § 29.53.240 (1972); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-1835(1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-1102.2 (1980); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 3365 (West
1983); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 91A401, 39-120 (1981) HAWAII REV. STAT. § 246-56(1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 711 (Smith-Hurd 1983-84); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 36, § 1073 (1964); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 211.61a (Supp. 1983-84); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 361.565 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80:21 (Supp. 1983); N.Y.
REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1002 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-24-
01 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5721.18 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68,§ 24312 (West Supp. 1983-84); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5971(g) (Purdon 1968);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2018 (Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-64 (Supp.
1983); W. VA. CODE § 1IA-3-2 (Supp. 1983).
1984]
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sales are not invalidated by failure to send or failure to receive the mailed
notice. 6 That provision resurrects a question of due process, which was ad-
dressed in Garzee v. Sauro.57 In Garzee, the Missouri Supreme Court said
that notice by mail cannot be merely optional,58 for that would imply that
notice by publication would satisfy due process. Citing Mullane, the court held
that notice by mail is mandatory within the limits of practicability.59
While Mennonite leaves sending notice to property owners debatable, the
Supreme Court made clear the notice requirement for mortgagees. For
mortagees of record, constructive notice by publication must be supplemented
by notice mailed to the mortgagee's last-known available address, or by per-
sonal service.60
Before Mennonite, only four states provided for mailed notice to both
mortagees and owners without request prior to sale.6 Three other states re-
quired notice to mortgagees upon request, and two of those charged a nominal
fee.62 There are also some twenty-two states which provide mortgagees with
notice after the sale but before the redemption period runs.6 3
The constitutionality of a state statute requiring a request to be filed
before notice is sent was not before the Mennonite court because that Indiana
statute was added after the events in Mennonite occurred.6 4 In Missouri, a
similar statute provides notice to mortgagees in power-of-sale foreclosures. 5
This scheme allows states to allocate resources by providing mailed notice only
to those who request it. Unfortunately, a mortgagee who does not have the
sophistication to discover whether tax sale proceedings have been initiated is
56. Ky. REV. STAT. § 134.440 (1982); Mo. REV. STAT. § 92.700 (1978); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 54-5-27 (West 1960).
57. 639 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. 1982).
58. Mo. REV. STAT. § 141.440 (Supp. 1982); see note 14 supra.
59. 639 S.W.2d at 832. Of course, "within the limits of practicability" is open
to definition. If a clerical error occurs and notice is sent to the wrong address, will the
sale be invalid?
60. 103 S. Ct. at 2711.
61. CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 3701 (West Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 12-157 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-9-11 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
32, § 5252 (1981).
62. IDAHO CODE § 63-1126B (1983); IND. STAT. ANN. § 6-1.1-24-4.2 (Burns
1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5201 (West 1983).
63. See note 38 supra; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 91A-434 (1980); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 120, § 744 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §
1076 (1978); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 211.73C (Supp. 1983-84); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 80:28 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54-5-77 (West 1983-84); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 57-27-02 (1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 24.323 (West 1966); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 12-49-300 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
64. See 103 S. Ct. at 2708 n.2.
65. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.325 (1978), adopted in 1973, 1973 Mo. Laws 469,
provides at least 20 days notice of a power-of-sale foreclosure for any person who files a
request in the recorder's office of the county where the real property is situated.
Whether this type of statute would be constitutional in a tax sale situation largely
depends on the outcome of the balancing of interests test discussed at note 68 infra.
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unlikely to be aware that he could request notice in the first place.
The Mennonite majority fashioned its rule from the view of the least so-
phisticated creditor, and then applied it across the board regardless of the
creditor's expertise. The Court appeared to be influenced by the current surge
in "creative financing,"6 6 whereby many homeowners are forced to become
first, or more often, junior mortgagees in order to sell their property. The
Court's description of the state's burden of providing notice by mail as rela-
tively modest also indicates the Court will not be swayed by a state's plea of
time or money constraints.17 Thus, if Mennonite is construed broadly, a state
must send notice whether a mortgagee has requested it or not.
As legislatures try to accommodate the Mennonite rule, request-type stat-
utes may become more prevalent, and the position of the Mennonite dissent
may ultimately prevail. The dissenting Justices stressed that earlier notice
cases used a balancing test which allowed a state to weigh its costs against the
interests of the relevant class.68 They pointed out that 95% of mortgagees are
private institutional lenders and federally supported agencies.69 As for those
5% non-professional money lenders, the dissent merely stated that the state
cannot reasonably be expected to assume the risk of its citizens' business ven-
tures.70 Thus, if Mennonite is construed narrowly, one may see a return to a
modified version of the "caretaker theory," with mortgagees having to take the
initial step to protect their interest.
Another potential area for litigation is the application of Mennonite to
interested parties other than owners and mortgagees. In dissent, Justice
O'Connor construed the Mennonite holding to apply to the legally protected
property interest of any party.71 The dissent believed that this problem is fur-
ther compounded by the uncertainty of what reasonable efforts the state must
provide in ascertaining the name and address of an affected party.7 2 Dicta
suggests that a state may be required to search even beyond the public
66. See generally M. MADISON & J. DWYER, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE Fi-
NANCING § 7.04 (1981); INST. OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., CREATIVE REAL ESTATE
FINANCING (1968).
67. 103 S. Ct. at 2712.
68. Id. at 2713 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Whether a particular method of
notice is reasonable depends on the outcome of the balance between the 'interest of the
State' and 'the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' ") (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314). The state's interest is maintaining a
balanced budget by collecting all revenues it is owed. The interest of the individual is to
save his ownership in a piece of real estate. Since real estate taxes are a major source
of funding for public schools and county government, it is likely the scales are tipped in
favor of the state.
69. 1982-83 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 511.
70. 103 S. Ct. at 2716 n.6 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2712. This holding could apply to other situations, like power-of-sale
foreclosures.
72. Id. at 2715.
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The Missouri Supreme Court posed one such problem when it applied
Mennonite to deed of trust beneficiaries in Lohr v. Cobur Corp.74 In his con-
curring opinion, Judge Blackmar queried whether the appropriate notice
should be given to the trustee, the beneficiary, or both.7 5 Trustees are usually
lawyers or bank officers who have no personal interest in the property, and
often are unaware that the deed of trust exists. Notice to the beneficiary is
clearly more important, but it would be prudent to send notice to both.
In Missouri, however, giving notice to the current beneficiary or mortga-
gee may be quite difficult. Missouri law does not require that assignments of
real estate mortgages and deeds of trust be recorded.7 6 Thus, without addi-
tional investigation, a tax collector has no way of knowing if the first mortga-
gee still has an interest in the property. This is another problem the Missouri
legislature must address. 77
Another interested party is the possesser of a mineral estate which has
been severed from the surface fee. Courts have held that a county's tax lien is
on the entire estate, and a title founded on a tax sale will include both the
surface and mineral interest.78 The Missouri Supreme Court has held that the
local assessor need not ascertain the exact status of titles, nor determine the
73. Id. at 2711 n.4.
74. 654 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). Defendant Cobur had executed and
delivered a deed of trust to Pioneer Bank and Trust Co. as security for a loan. Thomas
Powers was named trustee; his name and the bank's name and address were contained
in the recorded deed. Nevertheless, when real estate taxes became delinquent and pro-
ceedings were commenced by the collector of Revenue of St. Louis County, neither
Pioneer nor Powers received mailed notice of the sale, nor were their names mentioned
in the published notice. Lohr purchased the property at the tax sale, and ultimately
brought suit to quiet title. Pioneer and Powers counterclaimed, asserting that their
recorded first deed of trust was in full force. The trial court found that the notice
provisions of Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 140.150, .170 (1969) were unconstitutional as ap-
plied. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, citing Mullane and Mennonite. 654
S.W.2d at 855-56.
75. Id. at 887 (Blackmar, J., concurring).
76. As a result, according to an informal survey of three title companies, only
10-20% of the assignments are recorded.
77. On November 11, 1983 at a meeting of the Missouri Bar Property Law
Committee, a draft bill was presented which would repeal Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 443.040-
.120, .390 (1978), which dealt with presentation of notes for identification or cancella-
tion. The proposed act would require that mortgage assignments be recorded.
78. See Payne v. A.M. Fruh Co., 98 N.W.2d 27, 31 (N.D. 1959); Christie-
Stewart, Inc. v. Paschall, 502 P.2d 1265, 1267-68 (Okla. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 100
(1973), reh'g denied, 544 P.2d 505 (Okla. 1974), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
But see Kirk v. Smith, 253 So. 2d 492, 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (tax deed
extinguished previously reserved mineral rights, but only because the sale occurred
prior to enactment of FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.481 (West 1983) requiring separate taxa-
tion of surface and subsurface interests); Wilson v. Clark, 278 So. 2d 250, 254 (Miss.
1973) (tax sale purchaser did not obtain mineral interest due to uncertainty of its
description, despite his three years in possession).
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names of individuals with an interest in the estate for either a valid assessment
or a valid sale.7 ' Thus, not only would a holder of a mineral estate fail to
receive mailed notice, but his name would not even appear in the newspaper
notice. The Missouri court found nothing in the statutory plan that requires
that a township assessor be a skilled title examiner.8 0 Mennonite, however,
seems to require a search for mineral interests and that appropriate notice be
sent to holders of these interests.8'
The leaseholder is also an interested party. Some long-term leases require
the lessee to pay property taxes. If the lessee's name is the only one on record
with the tax collector, then the problem shifts back to the owner getting no-
tice. But in many tenant-landlord situations, the tenant is not responsible for
property taxes and would be totally unaware of a pending tax sale. Even for
recorded leases, the vast majority of states do not provide the leaseholder with
notice. Furthermore, a tenant risks being evicted by the tax sale purchaser, or
at the very least, having his rent raised. Unlike private mortgage foreclosures,
where the purchaser takes possession subject to any leaseholds created prior to
the mortgage, many states issue a tax deed totally free of encumbrances.8 2 The
extra burden to tax collectors to mail notice to tenants is minimal, at least for
single-family residential property. If the taxpayer's address is different than
the property's address, it could be assumed the property is being rented, and it
would be simple to send separate notice to "occupant." Of course, the situa-
tion is more complicated for apartment complexes or large commercial
buildings.83
Once a tenant receives notice of a pending tax sale, there may be addi-
tional complications. In some states, a tenant may not acquire a title at a tax
79. Dornman v. Minnich, 336 S.W.2d 500, 507 (Mo. 1960), (overruling
Kernkamp v. Wellsville Fire Brick Co., 237 Mo. App. 457, 170 S.W.2d 692 (1943)).
80. Dornman, 336 S.W.2d at 507.
81. Some courts take the view that the mineral estate will not vest in the tax
sale purchaser if mineral rights are assessed and taxed separately. See note 78 supra.
Thus, the mineral estate holder would not have a property interest affected, and the
Mennonite rule would not apply. It may be prudent for a tax collector to send notice
anyway.
82. In jurisdictions where the tax is a charge only on the land, where no per-
sonal liability is contemplated, and where the proceeding is strictly in rem, the title
conveyed pursuant to a valid tax sale is generally not the title of the delinquent tax-
payer, but a new title to the land in fee simple absolute, created by an independent
grant from the sovereign. 72 AM. JUR. 2D Taxation § 962 (1974); see Bell v. Myers, 28
Md. App. 339, 343-46, 345 A.2d 105, 108-09 (1975); State ex rel. Buder v. Hughes,
350 Mo. 547, 552, 166 S.W.2d 516, 518 (1942); Morey Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. St.
Louis Artificial Ice Rink Co., 242 Mo. 241, 252-53, 146 S.W. 1142, 1143-44 (1912).
Some states treat tax sales as proceedings in personam which give purchasers the title
held by the delinquent taxpayer. See Annot., 75 A.L.R. 416 (1931).
83. It would be expensive for the state to send notice to every renter, but in that
situation it is unlikely a tax sale purchaser would evict renters of income-producing
property. Nor is it likely that one renter in a complex would want, or could afford, to
purchase the whole building. Perhaps in a commercial setting, a corporate renter would
prefer to buy the building rather than move or negotiate a new lease.
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sale that could be asserted against his landlord.8 In other words, a tenant
cannot take advantage of the landlord's failure to pay taxes in order to termi-
nate the relationship between them. Instead, the tenant's remedy is to pay the
delinquent taxes and deduct them from the rent. In states that allow tenants to
purchase at tax sales, it has been held that the tenant cannot assert the tax
title against the landlord until the tenant has surrendered possession.85
Remaindermen are yet another class whose property interests are affected
by tax sales. While there are some future interests that are impossible or im-
practical for tax collectors to ascertain,88 some recorded deeds very plainly set
out who is the life tenant and who is the remainderman. Courts have held that
purchasers of tax deeds obtain title to the fee, which includes remainder es-
tates,87 so without notice a remainderman must totally rely on the ability and
good faith of the life tenant to pay taxes. Moreover, the remainderman's inter-
est is often more valuable than the life tenant's. It makes sense for tax collec-
tors to provide remaindermen the opportunity to protect their interest, for, as
Mennonite pointed out in the case of mortgagees, it may ultimately relieve the
county of the more substantial administrative burden of conducting a tax
sale.88
One interested party that may not need notice is an owner of an ease-
ment. The majority of courts, Missouri included, have held that a tax sale
purchaser takes land subject to any easements or restrictive covenants. 89 The
reasoning is that the dominant estate's value is increased by the existence of
the easement, and the tax should reflect this increase. The servient estate de-
clines in value, and a sale for nonpayment of that tax ought to be a sale of the
lessened estate, and the title passed is subject to the easement." In jurisdic-
tions which hold that a tax deed includes all easements, the easement holder
has a legally protected interest at stake and should be considered an interested
party within the Mennonite rule.91 Even in jurisdictions where easements are
protected, a tax collector that has searched the title for all the other interests
might as well send one more letter.
84. See Brunson v. Bailey, 245 Ala. 102, 104, 16 So. 2d 9, 11 (1943); Macum-
ber v. Gillett, 138 Neb. 714, 719, 294 N.W. 854, 857 (1940). See generally Annot.,
172 A.L.R. 1181, 1186 (1948) (discussion of minority view).
85. Quon v. Sanguinetti, 60 Ariz. 301, 304-05, 135 P.2d 880, 881 (1943);
Simpson v. Ricketts, 185 Miss. 280, 292-93, 186 So. 318, 320 (1939).
86. Some remainders are contingent because the identity of the remainderman
cannot be ascertained. For example, when the remaindermen are the heirs of the life
tenant, their identity cannot be determined until the life tenant's death. L. SIMES & A.
SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 152 (2d ed. 1956).
87. See Pannell v. Moore, 237 Ga. 761, 762, 229 S.E.2d 603, 605 (1976); Hu-
nott v. Critchlow, 365 Mo. 600, 612-14, 285 S.W.2d 594, 602-03 (1956).
88. 103 S. Ct. at 2712 n.5.
89. See Engel v. Catucci, 197 F.2d 597, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Budnick v. Indi-
ana Nat'l Bank, 165 Ind. App. 457, 466, 333 N.E.2d 131, 134 (1975); Schlafly v.
Baumann, 341 Mo. 755, 763-64, 108 S.W.2d 363, 368 (1937).
90. Engel, 197 F.2d at 599.
91. But see Annot., 168 A.L.R. 529, 530 (1947).
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One more party to consider is a judgment lienholder. Missouri courts
have long held that a tax lien is superior, and any inferior liens are extin-
guished by a tax sale, except that the lienholder retains the right of redemp-
tion.92 To exercise this redemption, however, the lienholder needs to realize a
sale has taken place. It is unlikely these people will read the published notices,
so once again Mennonite's holding implies that notice must be mailed. This
class of interested parties may place a greater burden on tax collectors. In
Missouri, judgment liens will not be found in the recorder's office along with
the rest of the pertinent information. It is conceivable the collector must check
the county court docket along with the rest of the pertinent information. It is
conceivable the collector must check the county court docket every day up to
the date of the tax sale for new lienholders. Perhaps it is here that courts will
draw the line and carve an exception to Mennonite.
Following Mennonite, it may be reasonable to assume that states must
provide mailed notice to all interested parties before a tax sale is constitu-
tional. There is a parallel constitutional question, however, that Mennonite
failed to raise. Tax sales could be attacked for failure to provide an opportu-
nity for a hearing. After Mullane, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.93 and
Fuentes v. Shevin94 held that procedural due process required not only notice,
but an opportunity to be heard. A number of states have since utilized Fuentes
to invalidate power of sale provisions. 5 The same arguments could be made
against tax sales, but the courts have not addressed this issue.
The state could argue that since so few issues are presented in a delin-
quent tax situation, a hearing would serve no purpose. Whether or not the
taxes are actually delinquent might be an issue, but if the taxes have been
paid, any subsequent sale would be void. On the other hand, the Supreme
Court has held that if a person is entitled to a hearing, he has the right to
support his allegations by argument, however brief, and if need be, by proof,
however informal."6 There is no doubt that there is state action in a tax sale
proceeding and that a constitutionally protected interest is being affected.
92. McMullin v. Carter, 639 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). Carter relied
on Lohr v. Cobur Corp., 622 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (lien on the deed of
trust extinguished by tax sale). Lohr was recently overruled. See note 74 and accompa-
nying text supra); see also State ex rel. Buder v. Hughes, 350 Mo. 547, 166 S.W.2d
516 (1942).
93. 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment without provision for a ju-
dicial hearing prior to a garnishment violated due process clause).
94. 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (state replevin statutes struck down because they did
not provide for an opportunity to be heard before chattels were taken from the
possessor).
95. See, e.g., Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976); Turner
v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D. N.C. 1975). See generally G. OSBORNE, G.
NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 16, § 7.25.
96. Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (assessment, appor-
tionment, and collection of property taxes); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (hearing required prior to termination of welfare benefits).
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Whether the sale triggers the right to a hearing will ultimately be decided by
weighing the private interest against the cost in time and money to the state.
It is clear that Mennonite affects the rights of parties with a legal interest
in property subject to a tax sale. This case also affects those who purchase
property at tax sales. At first glance, Mennonite appears only to cast a cloud
on tax titles, but in the long run, this case could improve marketability of tax
titles.
In Missouri, the legislature has not been consistent in protecting grantees
of a tax deed from attack by delinquent owners.97 Tax deeds issued prior to
1845 were held to be no evidence of title,98 so marketability was negligible.
This improved after 1872, when general tax laws provided that tax deeds were
prima facie evidence of title." In 1933, the Jones-Munger Act specified a stat-
utory form for tax deeds, and failure to comply meant a void title.100 These
procedural requirements resulted in more title defects, and thus, reduced mar-
ketability. The best attempt at strengthening tax titles was a 1949 amendment
that provided that tax deeds are conclusive evidence of title two years from
recording the deed.101 This statute is still in effect, but it only applies to first
class charter counties electing not to operate under Jones-Munger.102
For out-state Missouri, tax titles continue to be difficult to market, despite
a special three-year statute of limitations.103 Other states' limitations range
from one to seven years,11° but the length is irrelevant if the tax deeds can
continue to be attacked beyond the date set by statute. Since 1839,105 and
most recently in 1982,106 Missouri courts have tolled the running of the three-
year limitation for any number of reasons.1° One result has been Title Exami-
97. The tax sale purchaser is issued a certificate of purchase. Mo. REv. STAT. §
140.290 (1978). There is a two-year period of redemption, during which the purchaser
has an inchoate title. Id. § 140.340. If no one redeems the land, then on production of
the certificate of purchase, the collector shall execute a deed in fee simple absolute to
the purchaser/grantee. Id. § 140.420.
98. See Moreau v. Detchemendy, 41 Mo. 431 (1867); Bosworth v. Bryan, 14
Mo. 575 (1851); Reeds v. Morton, 9 Mo. 878 (1846); Morton v. Reeds, 6 Mo. 63
(1839).
99. Mo. REV. STAT. § 9958 (1929) (repealed 1933).
100. Mo. REv. STAT. § 140.46 (1949) (current version at id. (1978)).
101. Mo. REV. STAT. § 141.610 (1949) (current version at id. (1978)).
102. See note 14 supra. Mo. REV. STAT. § 92.855 (1978) also has a two-year
"conclusive evidence" provision for St. Louis City.
103. Mo. REV. STAT. § 140.590 (1978). See generally Scott, Marketability of
Tax Titles in Missouri, 20 UMKC L. REV. 153 (1952).
104. See, e.g.,. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 3638 (West 1983) (one year); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 4 (Smith-Hurd 1983-84) (seven years); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-
24-11 (Burns 1978) (two year rebuttable presumption, four year conclusive evidence);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 7.118 (1978) (five years if purchaser is in possession);
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1020 (McKinney 1980) (two years).
105. Morton v. Reeds, 6 Mo. 64 (1839).
106. Leuck v. Russell, 632 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (dicta).
107. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra. See generally M. GILL,
REAL PROPERTY LAW IN MISSOURI 1175-1194 (1949); M. GILL, MISSOURI TAX TITLES
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nation Standard 24 adopted by the Missouri Bar, 08 which in essence says an
examining attorney is justified in requiring proof of twenty-seven years of ad-
verse possession before passing title on any tax deed. Furthermore, adverse
possession is impossible in many instances, since much tax sale property con-
sists of vacant lots or scrub land.
This strict title standard does not encourage bidding at tax sales. Most
tax sale purchasers are not looking for a place to live. They are either specula-
tors or interested parties who want to recoup their loss. Either way, the pur-
chaser will most likely want to resell the property. Few people want to wait
twenty-seven years. Furthermore, adverse possession must be "continuous,
open, exclusive and peaceable."' 1 9 This will require more proof than merely
paying taxes. Purchasers at tax sales can be faced with owning property that
no title company will insure and no astute investor will buy. To expedite mat-
ters, purchasers must bring a suit to quiet title, hoping no interested party will
defend. This additional court time, which is always a cost to taxpayers, could
be eliminated through statewide application of a conclusive statute of limita-
tion. Mennonite may be the impetus for such legislation.
It seems that courts have compensated for lack of notice under the Jones-
Munger Law by applying the other statutory requirements quite strictly. In
rewriting the statutes to meet Mennonite's standard, notice under the adminis-
trative, power-of-sale foreclosure should become as constitutionally adequate
as that under judicial foreclosure. It would make little sense to continue to
have- two statutes of limitations. There are many benefits of a uniform policy.
First, marketability of title should be consistent whether the property is in
metropolitan or out-state Missouri. Second, a two-year statute of limitations
will encourage taxpayers to be more prompt about redeeming their claims, and
perhaps reduce delinquency as a whole. Third, purchasers at tax sales will bid
more if they are receiving a marketable title, thus reducing the number of
cases in which bids are not equal to the taxes. Fourth, if a tax deed is conclu-
sive evidence of title after two years, the extra time and money for suits to
quiet title will be eliminated." 0
Until the legislature makes the appropriate changes in the tax sales stat-
utes and tax collectors uniformly comply, tax sale purchasers are left in uncer-
tainty. As shown in Lohr v. Cobur Corp.,"' failure to mail notice to deed of
trust beneficiaries left the purchaser with a substantial cloud on his title. The
Missouri Supreme Court has recently heard a case where a non-resident prop-
erty owner sought to set aside a tax deed for failure to receive notice. The
court, applying Mennonite, held that, if the address of a non-resident property
(1938); Comment, Tax Deeds Void on Their Face and Three Year Statute of Limita-
tions, 20 Mo. L. REV. 87 (1955).
108. 23 Mo. ANN. STAT. ch. 442 app. (Vernon Supp. 1983).
109. Id.
110. Scott, supra note 103, at 162.
111. 654 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
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owner is readily available, mailed notice is required."' There is also the poten-
tial for other uninformed interested parties to attack a purchaser's title. What
remains to be answered is what remedy will a tax-sale purchaser have for
money paid into the public treasury.113 Regardless of the outcome, there will
be increased cost to the taxpayer and less money in the local treasury. This is
another reason for the legislature to act quickly.
The Mennonite decision does not address whether the new notice rule will
be applied retroactively. A general rule is that judicial decisions are to be
applied retroactively.114 This concept has its origin in English law. 15 As to the
construction of statutes, the general rule has been that a decision reversing or
overrruling a prior decision is generally retrospective in its operation and re-
lates back to the enactment of the statute.1 6 In more recent years, the federal
courts have created two sets of criteria for retroactivity. One applies to consti-
tutional rules of criminal procedure and is inapplicable in this case.1 1 7 The
other governs civil cases and was set out in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.118 In
Chevron Oil, the Supreme Court gave a history of non-retroactivity and cre-
ated a three-prong test: 1 9 (1) the decision must establish a new principle of
law either of first impression or one not "clearly foreshadowed"; (2) retrospec-
tive application should not retard the operation of the rule in question; and (3)
retroactivity should not produce substantial inequity. In Chevron, the Court
applied the rule in question prospectively,12 0 but subsequent federal decisions
applying the same test have decided rules should be applied retroactively.1 21
Retroactive applicability of judicial pronouncements is the rule, and there
is a strong presumption in favor of retroactivity in the federal courts.1 22 The
burden of proof is on the party who seeks prospective application only.1 2 3
112. Schwartz v. Dey, 665 S.W.2d 933 (Mo. 1984). The case was remanded to
determine the reasonableness of the collector's efforts to provide notice. 665 S.W.2d at
935.
113. This question was raised but not answered in Lohr v. Cobur Corp., 654
S.W.2d 883, 887 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (Blackmar, J., concurring).
114. Cash v. Califano, 621 F.2d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1980).
115. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *70 ("[S]ubsequent judges do not pre-
tend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation.").
116. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 194(a) (1940).
117. See Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 328 (1980).
118. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
119. Id. at 106-07.
120. In Rodriguez v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969), the Su-
preme Court held that the state statute of limitations on a personal injury action would
apply rather than the admiralty doctrine of laches. In Chevron, the Court decided ret-
roactive application of this decision would be inequitable and fail to promote the ra-
tionale behind the rule. 447 U.S. at 107.
121. See, e.g., In re Dillin, 557 F. Supp. 363, 364-65 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (applied
Truth-In-Lending regulations retroactively); Rachubka v. Incom Int'l, 555 F. Supp.
552, 553 (E.D. Ohio, 1982) (retroactive application of state statute of limitations gov-
erning vacation of arbitration award).
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Thus, in the Mennonite situation, if a mortgagee seeks to enforce its old mort-
gage on a tax sale purchaser where the statute of limitation has run, it will be
the purchaser who must carry the burden of proof.
The first prong of the Chevron test may be difficult for a purchaser to
prove. It could be said that Mennonite was clearly foreshadowed by Mullane.
Many cases have considered notice, and a decision applying due process notice
requirements to tax sales is not surprising. In fact, Indiana expanded its own
statute to include notice to mortgagees before Mennonite was appealed to the
Supreme Court.124 The second prong would be even harder to prove. The pur-
pose of the Mennonite rule is to give due process notice to mortgagees. Retro-
spective application of that rule would not retard its operation; rather, it would
promote it. The third prong of the test, however, will be a purchaser's main-
stay. Substantial inequitable results are possible if retroactivity relates back to
the enactment of a given tax sale statute. In Missouri, that would create
clouds on every tax title granted since 1933 when Jones-Munger was enacted,
or perhaps as far back as 1877. Even if retroactivity is enforced from the date
of Mullane, when standards for notice were foreshadowed, potential suits
could attack unperfected thirty-year old tax titles.
One possible compromise is to apply Mennonite retroactively to any tax
sales still within the period of redemption. This could be confusing, however,
as the length of redemption periods varies from state to state.125 As the court
in In re Dillin said, "Retroactivity cannot be applied on a piecemeal basis
dependent upon facts peculiar to each case. Otherwise, no clear rule of law
would evolve leaving courts and lenders alike in a quandry as to the applicabil-
ity of [the] particular judicial pronouncement."' 26 A federal court's best ap-
proach may be to apply Mennonite prospectively.
In Missouri courts, the test for retroactivity is different.2 In Barker v.
St. Louis County,28 the Missouri Supreme Court stated that if the overruled
decision deals with a rule of procedure, then the effect of the subsequent over-
ruling decision is prospective only; if the overruled decision deals with substan-
tive law, then the effect is retroactive. 2 9 Substantive law creates and defines
legal rights, while procedural law aids and protects those defined rights. 30
Barker dealt with a statute imposing a twenty-day limit for claims of compen-
sation in eminent domain cases. The court held the statute unconsitutional,
but held the effect of the decision would be prospective except as to the plain-
tiff. The court concluded that while eminent domain was a substantive right,
124. See note 10 supra.
125. Mo. REV. STAT. § 140.340 (1978) (two years); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW
§ 1020 (McKinney 1972) (one to three years, depending on the circumstances).
126. 557 F. Supp. 363, 365 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
127. Other than Oklahoma, Missouri appears to be the only state to use the pro-
cedure/substance test. See generally Annot., 10 A.L.R.3D 1371 (1966).
128. 104 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1937).
129. Id. at 377.
130. Id. at 377-78.
1984]
17
Dempsey: Dempsey: Due Process Notice Required for Real Estate Tax Sales
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1984
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
the twenty-day limit was a procedure for enforcing that right."'
A similar result occurred when the Missouri test was applied in State v.
Walker,13 2 where the rule that polygraph examinations were inadmissible was
deemed procedural in nature and, thus, only prospective in application. Mis-
souri courts have used the procedure/substance test for both civil and criminal
cases. The supreme court, however, has applied different standards from time
to time. In Keltner v. Keltner,833 the Missouri Supreme Court, citing a federal
decision,134 said that generally, it is considered undesirable to give retroactive
effect to overruling decisions, except under the most compelling circumstances.
Keltner dealt with a rule that an obligor under a divorce decree could be held
in contempt for failure to pay alimony. The court considered the degree to
which the prior rule may have been justifiably relied on.135 Since imprison-
ment was at stake, the court switched to a more standard criminal procedure
analysis.136
In deciding whether Mennonite or Lohr will be applied retroactively, the
Missouri court still may apply its old test. As in Barker, the notice provision
seems to be a procedural step. in the substantive right of a county to collect
delinquent taxes. On the other hand, interest in property is a substantive right
affected by lack of notice. Although an argument could be made for retrospec-
tive application, prior decisions lean in favor of prospective application only.
There is a difference, however, between the impact of retroactivity on title
examination as compared with litigation. A title examiner may be convinced
that courts will apply Mennonite prospectively, but nevertheless declare a tax
deed unmarketable because the title is not completely free from possible litiga-
tion. Until the courts settle this issue, doubts should be resolved against the
validity of title, and thus an examiner should assume retroactive application.137
Mennonite is a case with far-reaching impact. It will instigate legislative
revisions, litigation over tax titles, and a boon for title examiners. There
clearly is a new burden to tax collectors, but a simple solution is to conduct a
title search before every tax sale, and tack the $100.00 or more cost onto the
delinquent tax bill. If marketability of tax titles is increased by proper legisla-
tion, then the tax collectors' burden will be offset by the new surge of bidders
at tax sales.
For the sake of stability and avoidance of an avalanche of litigation, Men-
nonite should not be applied retroactively. There will be enough cases arising
131. Id. at 379.
132. 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. 1981) (en bane).
133. 589 S.W.2d 235, 239 (Mo. 1979).
134. United States ex rel. Angelet v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12, 21 (2d Cir. 1964), af'd,
381 U.S. 654 (1965).
135. 589 S.W.2d at 240 (citing Annot., 10 A.L.R.3D 1371, 1378 (1966)).
136. See note 117 supra.
137. Title insurance companies that deal with thousands of mortgages can afford
to take this small risk and spread any loss. This is more of a concern to individual
attorneys who examine titles.
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after June 22, 1983 to give Mennonite the landmark status it deserves.
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